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‘A Besy Woman … and Full of Lawe’ : Female Litigants in Early Tudor Star 
Chamber* 
A growing understanding of the legal experiences of medieval and early modern women has 
revealed the extent to which they were both proficient in the legal process and able to make 
informed, strategic decisions on the precise courts to petition. In so doing, their deliberations 
encompassed the court’s jurisdiction, the redress on offer, and the legal opportunities 
afforded to them; and a wealth of evidence currently suggests that certain courts were more 
advantageous for women, or at least enabled them to participate more frequently as named 
litigants.1 During the early Tudor period in England and Wales these options were broadened 
with the establishment of the prerogative court of Star Chamber as a judicial body.2 Its 
potential for offering ‘impartial’ justice increasingly drew plaintiffs from across the realm, 
which included regions such as the marches of Wales and the palatinate of Chester where 
local jurisdictions meant their inhabitants were excluded from the central common law 
                                                          
* The research underpinning this article was undertaken as part of the AHRC-funded project ‘Women 
Negotiating the Boundaries of Justice’ (Ref: AH/L013568/1). I would like to thank Teresa Phipps, Alex Shepard 
and Tim Stretton for their very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. 
1 E.g. Tim Stretton, Women Waging Law in Elizabethan England (Cambridge, 1998), 39−41. Maria L. Cioni, 
Women and Law in Elizabethan England with Particular Reference to the Court of Chancery (Garland, 1985); 
Emma Hawkes, ‘ “She Will … Protect and Defend her Rights Boldly by Law and Reason…”: Women’s 
Knowledge of Common Law and Equity Courts in Late-Medieval England’, in Medieval Women and the Law, 
ed. Noel James Menuge (Woodbridge, 2000), 145−61; Lindsay R. Moore, ‘Women and Property Litigation in 
Seventeenth-Century England and North America’, in Married Women and the Law: Coverture in England and 
the Common Law World, ed. Tim Stretton and Krista J. Kesselring (Ithaca, 2013), 118, 121, 123. 
2 Accounts for the court’s early development can be found in C.G. Bayne and William Huse Dunham, Select 
Cases in the Council of Henry VII (London: Selden Society, 1958) and J.A. Guy, The Cardinal’s Court: The 
Impact of Thomas Wolsey’s Star Chamber (Hassocks, 1977).  
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courts.3 Its use by female litigants, however, has yet to be fully examined, and hardly at all in 
its early years of development in the reigns of Henry VII and Henry VIII.4 While there are 
limitations to focusing on a single court, the documentation generated by Star Chamber – its 
bills of complaint, responses, and depositions – is unusually rich in detailing women’s 
interactions with law. In deploying these records, this article explores the extent to which 
women were able to capitalise on the legal opportunities offered by early Tudor Star 
Chamber. It will begin by assessing the quantitative data to provide a context for female 
participation as plaintiffs and defendants. Yet it will also show the problems in relying on 
these statistics for understanding the scale of women’s legal involvement. Through a 
qualitative study of cases from across England and Wales it considers the factors that may 
have determined whether, and in what circumstances, women appeared as plaintiffs; the 
strategies that may have underpinned decisions on how to structure litigation; and what can 
be inferred about women’s capacities to negotiate the system. 
 
In origin ‘Star Chamber’ simply referred to the regular meeting place used by the King’s 
Council at Westminster to conduct its administrative and judicial business. It was not until 
                                                          
3 It was the king’s claim to offer justice to all his subjects, which gave them access to prerogative courts: Ralph 
A. Griffiths, ‘The English realm and dominions and the king’s subjects in the later Middle Ages’, in Aspects of 
Late Medieval Government. Essays Presented to J.R. Lander, ed. J.G. Rowe (Toronto, 1986), 99; Melanie 
Katrina Lloyd, ‘The Privy Council, Star Chamber and Wales, 1540-1572’ (PhD diss., Swansea University, 
1987). For Cheshire’s judicial independence, see Tim Thornton, Cheshire and the Tudor State, 1480-1560 
(Woodbridge, 2000). 
4 Research undertaken on female litigants in later sixteenth-century Star Chamber includes Garthine Walker, ‘ 
“A Strange Kind of Stealing”: Abduction in Early Modern Wales’, in Women and Gender in Early Modern 
Wales, ed. Simone Clarke and Michael Roberts (Cardiff, 2000), 50−74. 
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the Tudor kings that it gave its name to a separate court of the realm, and it was mainly 
during Thomas Wolsey’s chancellorship (December 1515-October 1529) that its judicial 
function was advanced, areas of jurisdiction were defined and procedures formalised. As 
subjects could, in theory, petition the king and his council on any grievance, Star Chamber 
had a broad jurisdiction, dealing with both civil and criminal business. Its main subject of 
litigation was real property, but it also dealt with offences including breaches of the peace 
(such as riot, assault, trespass), the perversion of justice (such as perjury or maintenance, and 
the misdemeanours of crown officials), alongside a range of miscellaneous cases. Some of 
these issues, like fraud, forgery, and perjury, were ones not adequately dealt with in common 
law courts and, like Chancery, Star Chamber was a court to which plaintiffs turned to 
circumvent the limitations of common law.5 As a prerogative court, it was less formulaic and 
more flexible than common law courts and could be appealed to for help when other 
remedies had failed. This means a significant proportion of Star Chamber bills concerned 
cases that had already been brought or were pending in other central or local courts.6 It is a 
useful source, therefore, to examine women negotiating multiple jurisdictions. 
The court primarily operated for the benefit of private litigants and dealt with cases 
between two parties. A private suit was usually entered by filing a bill of complaint according 
to a particular form. It was composed with the advice of counsel, written in English, 
engrossed on parchment by professional scribes, signed by the plaintiff’s counsel and filed by 
a clerk. Should the case proceed beyond the bill stage, there would be a defendant’s answer, 
and sometimes the plaintiff’s replication and the defendant’s rejoinder (all of which 
                                                          
5 Guy, The Cardinal’s court, 52−3. 
6 John H. Baker, The Oxford History of the Law of England, vol. VI. 1483-1558 (Oxford, 2003), 118.  
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comprised the pleadings), followed by interrogations and depositions (the proofs).7 This 
process offers some advantages for the modern researcher. The documentation was composed 
from the perspective of the litigant and not the court; written interrogatories and depositions, 
which increasingly included those of the defendants, provide valuable details; and the 
narrative form and use of English in the pleadings offers the potential for “individualizing 
features”.8 Nevertheless, historians are conscious of the temptation to see these documents as 
the litigants’ own words and have long recognised that legal records were constructed with 
particular aims in mind. The process in Star Chamber, like any adversarial system, 
encouraged one party to demonstrate why their case was more persuasive than another, while 
counsel and scribes worked to ensure that petitioners had the best chance of success. This 
meant both recognising what was effective within a specific court, and what was sufficiently 
plausible to the audience and community out of which the case had emerged. It could not 
deviate significantly from what was culturally expected.9 In the case of Star Chamber, the 
onus was on the litigant to establish why the suit deserved that court’s attention and could not 
be resolved fairly in another jurisdiction, notably by common law courts. This meant that 
allegations often included violence, usually in the form of riot, forcible entry or assault, with 
                                                          
7 Bayne and Dunham, Select Cases; Guy, The Cardinal’s Court, 79. The original proceedings and proofs of Star 
Chamber are housed in The National Archives (TNA) in Kew, UK, under the class mark STAC. 
8 Joanne Bailey, ‘Voices in Court: Lawyers or Litigants?’ Historical Research, 74, no. 186 (2001): 392−408, at 
393; Cordelia Beattie, ‘ “Your Oratrice”: Women’s Petitions in the Late Medieval Court of Chancery’, in 
Women, Agency and the Law, 1300-1700, ed. Bronach Kane and Fiona Williamson (London, 2013), 20.  
9 Stretton, Women Waging Law, 13. Walker, ‘A Strange Kind of Stealing’, 54; Jamie Smith, ‘Women as Legal 
Agents in Late Medieval Genoa’, in Writing Medieval Women’s Lives, ed. Charlotte Goldy and Amy 
Livingstone (New York, 2012), 115. Marie A. Kelleher, The Measure of Women: Law and Female Identity in 
the Crown of Aragon (Philadelphia, 2010), 10−12; Gwen Seabourne, Imprisoning Medieval Women: the Non-
Judicial Confinement and Abduction of Women in England, c. 1170-1509 (Farnham, 2011), 130. 
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the aim of catching the attention of the judge. Given this condition, it is unsurprising that 
standardised phrases like “force and arms” appear with some regularity and allegations of 
widespread disorder should be treated with caution.10 Claims that there would be no fair trial 
at common law because the opponents were too powerful and the plaintiff too poor were also 
“easier to allege than refute”.11 Hence while cases may well speak to the violence that could 
be meted out in all walks of life, such details were also a legal prerequisite. 
 
The potential for finding female litigants in early sixteenth-century Star Chamber may 
not appear promising at first given the research undertaken on its later records: Tim Stretton’s 
sampling of the court for the later sixteenth century suggested that it had the ‘smallest female 
presence’ of all central courts. He estimated that women participated in 10% of Star Chamber 
cases under Elizabeth, before it dropped to 8.5% under James I.12 Yet the court may have 
appeared more favourable to women’s participation decades earlier, particularly following its 
reconfiguration under Wolsey. The Cardinal had promoted Star Chamber as a vehicle for 
‘indifferent justice’ and he convinced contemporaries that it was an effective instrument for 
checking the abuses of power by great men; it was less susceptible to bribery and local 
                                                          
10 John Guy has estimated that while plaintiffs alleged riot and unlawful assembly in nearly half of the cases 
during Wolsey’s chancellorship, in only 7% of cases is there any real evidence for it: J.A. Guy, The Court of 
Star Chamber and its Records to the Reign of Elizabeth I (London: 1985), 26, 52; J.D. Cooper, Propaganda and 
the Tudor State: Political Culture in the Westcountry (Oxford, 2003), 136–145. 
11 Majorie Blatcher, The Court of King’s Bench, 1450-1550: a Study in Self-Help (London, 1978), 26. 
12 Stretton, Women Waging Law, 40, fn. 80. For the observation that the court may have been less popular in 
general by Elizabeth’s reign, see Christopher W. Brooks, Law, Politics and Society in Early Modern England 
(Cambridge, 2009), 38.   
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lawlessness.13 Falls in business at both King’s Bench and Common Bench in the 1520s and 
30s have been attributed to the competition from Star Chamber as it drew away from them 
cases of trespass, assault, riot and rout.14 It became a court of preference. When in the 1520s 
the backlog of unresolved cases in Star Chamber from parties in the Welsh marches were 
referred to the Council in the Marches of Wales, it raised some opposition. An attorney on 
behalf of a ‘poor’ widow Margaret Grosvenor of Bellaport (Shropshire) wrote to the 
President of the Council arguing that her suit should be heard in Star Chamber because “her 
adversary is so mighty and greatly friended in those partes and she in such poverty that she 
thought she could have no remedy there against him”.15 Such claims were not confined to 
female litigants, but this check on abuses may have made prerogative courts particularly 
attractive to widows who were vulnerable to these local pressures.16 
A survey of the individual litigants shows that the court appealed to a broad cross-
section of the population. Among its female plaintiffs can be found a small number of 
abbesses and noblewomen, which include Margaret, countess of Salisbury, Sybil Kirke, the 
Prioress of St Leonard’s, Stratford-at-Bow, Agnes, duchess of Norfolk, and Anne, Countess 
of Oxford.17 Some wealth was required because Star Chamber, like other Westminster courts, 
did not represent a cheap option, and it had the potential to be very time-consuming, 
                                                          
13 Guy, The Cardinal’s Court, 30. 
14 Blatcher, The Court of King’s Bench, 29. 
15 National Library of Wales, MS 6620D, fol. 20r. The case was originally heard by the Council in the Marches 
on April 27, 1528 (and given a favourable outcome to the plaintiff) before going to Star Chamber and 
subsequently the Court of Requests: TNA, REQ 2/13/73. 
16 Cf. Gwilym Dodd, Justice and Grace. Private Petitioning in the English Parliament in the Late Middle Ages 
(Oxford, 2007), 214. 
17 Eg TNA, STAC, 2/12/310; STAC 2/17/26; STAC 2/18/167; STAC 2/22/248; STAC 2/27/113 and 142. 
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especially if living some distance from London and attendance was required on multiple 
occasions. Alice Morton from Odd Rode in Cheshire, for example, recounted how she had 
been forced to take lodgings in St Giles near London “by reason of dyvers contynuall suytys 
that she hathe aswell in thys honourable courte as in other of the kynges courtes”.18 Yet if it 
was a court for those with some resources, it nevertheless attracted those beyond the elite: 
while the biggest group of litigants in Wolsey’s chancellorship were the gentry, over a 
quarter were yeoman/husbandmen, which included those on modest incomes.19 The same 
may be said of the women who petitioned Star Chamber. They are not so easy to characterise 
as a group because their status was less likely to be mentioned, but a significant proportion 
similarly fall under the ‘middling sort’ and include those who defined themselves as working 
women.20 Elen Macham, widow of Bristol, described herself as someone who made her 
living through “manuell labour and dayly occupacion with her honndes”. She accused 
William Atkins of maiming her hands in Bristol, February 1530, which had impaired her 
ability to work.21 
Attempts to produce reliable statistics and determine the proportion of female litigants 
at Star Chamber is beset by problems that are both quantitative and archival. While the 
                                                          
18 TNA, STAC 2/26/126; she reiterated the complaint in STAC 2/18/42. On the other hand, her adversary 
Richard Golborne accused her of dwelling in London simply to vex him: STAC 2/18/216. 
19 John Guy calculated that the gentry formed 28.7% of litigants and yeomen/husbandmen 25.4%: The 
Cardinal’s Court, 109. G.R. Elton, Star Chamber Stories (London, 1958), 9. 
20 In most cases social identifiers are only noted when mentioned in relation to husbands: hence we find a 
widow of a husbandman (STAC 2/27/86), labourer (STAC 2/24/427) and shoemaker (STAC 2/29/74). The 
difficulties of determining the social standing of women involved in court cases is noted elsewhere: Kelleher, 
The Measure of Women, 8. 
21 TNA, STAC 2/28/18. 
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court’s regular sittings and the centrality of the written record generated a considerable 
amount of material, significant losses have occurred over the years – Guy estimates this 
amounts to half of the archive – and many suits are now incomplete.22 Most often the bill 
survives, but some suits have to be recreated from an answer, replication, a series of 
interrogatories or even a single deposition, and not all the proofs contain the litigants’ names. 
Frustratingly, almost no decrees, orders or awards are extant, which means that we have no 
verdicts for the suits recorded.23 In addition to these losses, the remaining archive of original 
proceedings at the National Archives has not been well-served and its current catalogue needs 
to be used with caution, especially as there is some under-reporting of female litigants.24 
While the class STAC 1 should contain the pertinent records of Henry VII’s reign and STAC 
2 those of Henry VIII, they both include records from other courts and other reigns, and early 
sixteenth-century material is scattered in several other classmarks. This includes the 
miscellaneous collection STAC 10, which remains only partially catalogued. It is also not 
unusual to find examples of a single suit spread across several entries: the surviving 
documents relating to the abduction of Jane ap Howell from Llanwern Church (near Newport, 
South Wales), for example, are divided between four separate references.25 Ongoing 
                                                          
22 Guy, The Court of Star Chamber, 23. 
23 Some information on sentences is available for the later sixteenth-century: K.J. Kesselring, Star Chamber 
Reports. BL Harley MS 2143 (List & Index Society, special series vol. 57, 2018). 
24 Catalogue entries where wives are not currently mentioned as co-litigants include those in STAC 2/16, fols. 
181-2; STAC 2/17/389; STAC 2/18/224.  
25 TNA, STAC 2/20/223 (bill of complaint); STAC 2/26/394 (list of interrogatories); STAC 2/24/34 and STAC 
10/4/82 (depositions). A full discussion of this case and other related sources can be found in Deborah Youngs, 
‘“A Vice Common in Wales”: Abduction, Prejudice and the Search for Justice in the Regional and Central 
Courts of Early Tudor Society’, in The Welsh and the Medieval world: Travel, Migration and Exile, ed. Patricia 
Skinner (Cardiff, 2018), 131−154. 
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revisions and corrections will improve the catalogue’s reliability, but it will not be possible to 
overcome all these issues and reach an accurate total number of Star Chamber cases. As such 
it seems reasonable to use Guy’s estimates of just over 200 cases from Henry VII’s reign and 
around 5000 for the reign of Henry VIII.26 
Given these challenges, it would be unwise to proffer a definitive number of female 
litigants. An estimation can, nevertheless, be indicative of the attraction of Star Chamber. A 
search through the records of STAC 1, STAC 2, and STAC 10, produces a sample of 
approximately 735 cases that contain at least one female plaintiff.27 If one uses Guy’s 
suggested overall numbers for the cases in the early Tudor conciliar court (in other words 
around 5200), then this amounts to 14% of the surviving material, a notably higher proportion 
than calculated for the later sixteenth century. This figure is not out of line with calculations 
of female participation in other secular law courts, although different approaches to counting 
litigants means precise comparison is difficult. One example where a similar proportion can 
be seen is in Penny Tucker’s investigation of London law courts where, in its main court of 
                                                          
26 Guy, The Court of Star Chamber, 20. The careless and misguided treatment of Star Chamber records in 
previous centuries makes it unlikely that a definitive number of cases dating to the early Tudor kings will ever 
be determined: not all files can be attributed to specific suits (particularly in the case of the numerous 
uncatalogued depositions in STAC 10), and odd records remain scattered in other classes. Fortunately, the 
catalogue is currently undergoing revision; my thanks to Dr Amanda Bevan, Dr Sean Cunningham, and Dr Euan 
Roger of TNA for their assistance. 
27 In totting up the number, I have counted as a single suit all related documents that focus on the same subject 
and with the same named litigants. In some instances the issue remains constant, but the defendant has changed 
and this has been counted as a separate suit. I have searched STAC 1, STAC 2 (all catalogued) and STAC 10 
boxes 1, 3, 4, 6, 8, 10 and 18 (which contain the earliest Star Chamber material). Some documents pertaining to 
cases temp. Henry VIII’s reign are also in STAC 3, although those featuring female litigants relate to suits found 
in STAC 2 and STAC 10. 
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Hustings, women comprised around one in seven (or 14%) first or sole demandants.28 In Star 
Chamber female plaintiffs appear in three ways: solely named; recorded alongside their 
husbands; and in a group. Of these, the largest category is that of the wives who account for 
46% of cases involving female litigants. The second largest group are the 43% where women 
entered a bill as sole plaintiff. These involve 300 different women, the majority of whom 
were widows. In addition, there are around 11% of cases where female plaintiffs were 
mentioned alongside one or more individuals, but to whom they were not obviously married; 
instead their associates may include a sibling, parent, other relative or member of the 
household. While most of these groups are mixed, there are six cases of all-female groups. 
For example, in the marches of Wales, Anne Massey and her daughter Magdalene brought 
two suits over claims to a number of Cheshire manors.29 Star Chamber appears a court, 
therefore, that drew a range of women and while they were slightly more likely (at 57%) to 
appear as co-plaintiff, a significant number of those women entered bills as the sole litigant. 
It was the recourse of the married and unmarried in roughly equal measure. 
These proportions are in stark contrast to the number of women whose experience of 
Star Chamber was as defendants. There are just over 300 cases in which at least one female 
defendant is named, or nearly 6% in total. Such a disparity is not present in every legal 
                                                          
28 Penny Tucker, Law Courts and Lawyers in the City of London, 1300-1550 (Cambridge, 2007), 234−5, 238. 
Other studies offer similar percentages, although through different means. For example, Emma Hawkes, 
calculated that women comprised 15% of litigants in Chancery bills originating in Yorkshire during the fifteenth 
century: Hawkes, ‘“She Will Protect”’, 151. 
29 TNA, STAC 2/28/12. This followed their attempts to seek justice at courts in Chester and the Council in the 
Marches of Wales: see TNA, STAC 2/6, fols. 282−292. 
11 
 
jurisdiction and women can be found more frequently as defendants in some urban courts.30 
However, this figure is in line with other central courts like Chancery:  in Timothy Haskett’s 
analysis for the years 1417-1532, he calculated that women comprised 21% of petitioners, but 
only 7% of respondents (with a figure of 13% for all female litigants during that period).31 
For the majority of this sample (85%) female defendants appear either as the wife of another 
named defendant, or as a member of a group of defendants; there are only around forty cases 
where a woman appears as the sole defendant. Most were answering complaints by men, yet 
it is worth noting that 25% of the cases in which women were defendants were brought by 
female litigants or co-litigants, a greater proportion than the overall percentage of female 
plaintiffs. As the majority of female defendants were co-litigants with their husbands, it could 
be that female plaintiffs were more likely to name the defendant’s wife in the bill or that their 
case was in reality with her. Overall, these data show, firstly, that Star Chamber was a court 
to which women went largely as plaintiffs. Secondly, it means that the total number of cases 
featuring female litigants (plaintiffs, defendants or both) in Star Chamber is approximately 
960 or around 18%; a proportion close to that of Chancery and Requests.32  
 
                                                          
30 See, for example, London’s Sheriff’s court where in 1461-2 only 23% of cases featuring female litigants 
involved a female plaintiff, whereas 78% involved a female defendant: Matthew Frank Stevens, ‘London 
Women in the Courts and the ‘Golden Age’: a Quantitative Analysis of Female Litigants in the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Centuries’, The London Journal, 37, no. 2 (2013): 67−88, at 74. 
31 Haskett did note a gradual increase in the proportion of women as respondents and decline as petitioners 
during the later Middle Ages. This might reflect women’s “increasing participation in matters of property and 
inheritance, or a more vulnerable state as executors or heirs”: Timothy S. Haskett, ‘The medieval English Court 
of Chancery’, Law and History Review, 14:2 (1996): 245−313, at 286−7. 
32  Stretton, Women Waging Law, 38−42. Cf. Stevens, ‘London Women’, 117. 
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Figures cannot provide the whole picture, although the regularity with which similar 
percentages appear in studies on female litigants is noteworthy. Historians have long 
provided reasons for the persistently low proportion of female litigants, commonly related to 
patriarchal societies’ expectations and the cultural and legal constraints placed on women’s 
activity and agency, but it is worth looking more closely at the extent these conventions 
reduced or enhanced women’s activities in Star Chamber. Fortunately, the narrative form of 
the court’s pleadings and surviving depositions provide an opportunity to look beyond the 
named litigants and their stated cause. In these we often see far more female involvement 
than counting plaintiffs and defendants would suggest. 
Useful examples can be found among the depositions, which are invaluable for 
building a fuller picture of the case, albeit through the mediating lens of legal counsel (who 
set and guided the questions) and the pens of scribes (who summarised and standardised the 
responses). It is true that the vast majority of witnesses were men: as elsewhere, there seems 
to be a general uneasiness about accepting a woman’s testimony. It was not, however, 
because female testimony itself was legally unacceptable.33 In Star Chamber cases, where 
women were questioned, they appear to have witnessed some part of the illegal activity: 
examples include Janet Gaunt whose husband sold on stolen goods taken from a robbery at 
York,34 and Margaret Stokes whose fireside table was the surface on which Joan Bamford set 
                                                          
33 Nicola Whyte, ‘Custodians of Memory: Women and Custom in Rural England, c.1550-1700’, Cultural and 
Social History (2011): 153−173, at 154; Jeremy Goldberg, Communal Discord, Child Abduction and Rape in 
the Later Middle Ages (Basingstoke, 2008), 47; Andy Wood, The Politics of Social Conflict in the Peak District, 
1520-1770 (Cambridge, 1999), 132−3; Elizabeth Ewen, ‘Scottish Portias: Women in the Courts in Medieval 
Scottish Towns’, Journal of the Canadian Historical Association, 3, no. 1 (1992): 27−43 at 31−2, 36. 
34 TNA, STAC 2/22/320. 
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out her payment in gold coin to John Wakefield in January 1521.35 On occasion we glimpse a 
female voice being used as the main support for a plaintiff’s case. Dionysis, the wife of John 
Dereham, for example, was the key witness in the inquest into the alleged brutality of 
Richard Wharton, bailiff of Bungay, in his treatment of Anne Crakingthorpe.36 The examples 
likewise support the view that women were considered authorities on particular matters, such 
as kinship, births, deaths, marriage and household goods.37  Of the three women called in the 
depositions taken in the case of Alice Symonds versus John Goddisland one recounted a 
family’s connections, another was in possession of a relevant household chest, while a third 
was an eye-witness to a meeting between her husband and Goddisland at their home.38 We 
also get a sense of how information passed between women. When Alice Swettenham 
petitioned Star Chamber following the murder of her husband, she claimed that the wife of 
the ‘principal’ murderer John Brydon had spoken of her husband’s involvement, and had 
consorted with and abetted him.39 What this indicates is that, while women were rarely legal 
witnesses, they evidently heard and saw actions that gave them the potential to provide 
testimony, even if it was deemed unnecessary or unhelpful for them to do so. As Nicola 
Whyte has shown, female social and gossip networks were vital in the forming and 
maintaining of local oral memories.40 These witnesses remind us that female involvement in 
                                                          
35 TNA, STAC 2/24/402. 
36 TNA, STAC 2/4, fol. 109 (her deposition); STAC 2/11/17 (the bill where Dionysis is named as an eye-
witness). 
37 Kelleher, The Measure of Women, 43. 
38 TNA, STAC 2/23/271. 
39 TNA, STAC 2/18/162. 
40 Whyte, ‘Custodians of Memory’, 155, 169. 
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legal process was not confined simply to those named as plaintiff or defendant, and gendered 
choices were made in selecting legal voices. 
Women’s potential presence and legal absence also have a bearing on the small 
number of female defendants. The type of cases taken to Star Chamber and the framing of 
bills reduced the likelihood that women would be named defendants. In some cases, it was 
simply unlikely for them to be accused. Suits directed at corrupt officials and the 
maintenance of criminals would have excluded women who did not inhabit these judicial or 
administrative functions. The largest issue in early Star Chamber was real property, often in 
terms of trespass and unlawful entry or disseised land, and these cases were dominated by 
men.41 In addition, the emphasis placed in Star Chamber bills on force, weaponry and riotous 
gang-like behaviour reduced the probability of women being mentioned because they were 
less likely to cause such disorder, or at least be accused of doing so. Individuals and their 
legal advisers may have felt less able – or willing – to construct a convincing case of 
uncontrolled female power to set before the judges in Star Chamber.42 Nevertheless, it is 
important to draw attention to those occasions where women were accused of commanding or 
being among ‘diverse riotous and evil persons’, notably in the defence of property.43 A few 
cases are revealed in the depositions,44 but others feature in the framing of the original bill: 
John Holwell, for example, accused Anne Weneman and various men of entering his property 
                                                          
41 Karen Jones, Gender and Petty Crime in Late Medieval England: the Local Courts in Kent, 1460-1560 
(Woodbridge, 2006), 36−9, 204−5. 
42 For courts seeing violence by women as unnatural see Miriam Müller, ‘Social Control and the Hue and Cry in 
Two Fourteenth-Century Villages’, Journal of Medieval History, 31 (2005), 29−53, at 41−2. 
43 For an analysis of female assailants and their significant role in disputes over property, see Garthine Walker, 
Crime, Gender and Social Order in Early Modern England (Cambridge, 2003), Chapter 3, particularly 75−77. 
44 E.g TNA, STAC 2/18/219; STAC 2/24/383. 
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with force and arms.45 Wives appear most frequently in these instances, often alongside their 
husbands as named rioters, and sometimes as proxies carrying out their husbands’ orders, 
usually by commanding their servants to undertake the trespass.46 Nonetheless, it appears 
accepted that women could take a more active role, and that female violence was part of the 
common legal framing of violence not something separate. In the case of Alex Marshland, he 
not only accused Margaret Holford of leading the riot in Bosden (Cheshire), but specified that 
she had carried a staff while doing so; the men alongside her were listed as brandishing the 
frequently cited ‘swords, daggers, and bucklers’. Marshland’s bill also accused Holford’s 
daughters, Elyn and Blanche, of wielding staffs and using them to beat both his wife and his 
servant (they tellingly did not touch him).47 In other suits women were alleged to have 
attacked or guarded property with weapons such as bills, pitchforks, stones, and boiling 
water.48 Accusations of women meting out violence, therefore, were considered sufficiently 
believable to be included in the bill, but the weapons were lower grade than the men’s; direct 
violence was commonly enacted on other women; and the overall numbers are small. 
Women’s potential to disrupt was more conspicuous, however, in attempts to discredit 
their petitions. This, it should be noted, was not a routine feature of pleadings, but broader 
cultural and social predispositions did generate prejudicial views of disobedient and 
disorderly females that speak to a society’s distrust of a woman’s voice. There are cases that 
                                                          
45 TNA, STAC 2/21/70. 
46 E.g. TNA, STAC 2/4, fols. 92, 194-5; STAC 2/6/279 STAC 2/10, fols. 47, 79; STAC 2/11/31; STAC 2/13, 
fols. 23, 171; STAC 2/21/70; STAC 2/29/31. At the commandment of their husbands: TNA, STAC 2/29/21, and 
STAC 2/6/68. 
47 TNA, STAC 2/33/287. 
48 E.g. TNA, STAC 2/10, fol. 53 and STAC 2/17/277. For the (potentially) gendered use of weapons see 
Walker, Crime, Gender and Social Order, 78−9. 
16 
 
illustrate their susceptibility to accusations of sexual misconduct, which female plaintiffs had 
to negotiate. Joan Perry of Kensington, widow, was called “a comyn advonterer [i.e. 
adulterer] and bawde”,49 while Jane Apryce was accused (by her ex-husband) of “vicious 
lyving which she dayly usith in maynteynyng commen single women”.50 Other women who 
chose to use their voice in a legal and public arena drew criticism for electing to do so and 
were rebuked for interfering. Alice Symonds of Barnstaple in a bill of complaint against John 
Goddisland drew on perceptions of female weakness in describing herself as “on lerned” [i.e. 
unlearned], and she blamed her counsel for failing to remember all the legal niceties when 
they had engaged in a previous suit. It is an image that also draws on representations of the 
naïve woman, a trope found in other assertions that female litigants had been duped through 
the “synastre counsaill” of male relatives or advisers.51 Yet the number of suits Alice had 
pursued during the first half of the sixteenth century belies this picture of ignorance, as her 
adversary was all too aware.52 Such activity had gained her a reputation for litigiousness that 
was considered unseemly for women: Goddisland had apparently scuppered a potential 
marriage arrangement by telling her intended that Alice was a “besy woman of her tong and 
she ys full of lawe & she doth put one to moch besynes”.53 In a similar vein, Richard 
Golborne’s response to Alice Moreton’s complaint was to describe her as a “veray trobelous 
                                                          
49 TNA, STAC 2/25/281. 
50 TNA, STAC 2/10/130. 
51 As was argued, for example, in the cases involving Edith Darnell (STAC 2/12/166), Anne Harwell (STAC 
2/26/479; STAC 2/25/237), and Joan Stanton (STAC 2/18/228). 
52 Alice took several cases to Chancery including a few where she acted as executrix for her second husband, 
Robert Symonds. She had previously been married to John Chaffy, an innholder in Illminster, and had 
presumably gained considerable experience negotiating with people: TNA, C1/279/39, C1/284/49, C1/442/15, 
C1/446/15 and C1/1513/78. 
53 TNA, STAC 2/23/271. 
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and besy woman” whose sole pleasure was to trouble and vex the said defendant.54 This is 
not to argue that male litigants were immune to criticisms of licentiousness, but that women’s 
susceptibility to such accusations – especially given the widespread belief that women should 
be under the guidance of men – more directly influenced the framing of their bills and 
responses. 
In this context of limited legal authority, female litigants and their counsel made 
strategic decisions about which court to petition and how to present their case, including 
whom to name as plaintiff(s). One determining factor appears to be the type of suit brought. 
Female plaintiffs went to court over the same range of issues as men, if not on the same scale; 
nevertheless, it is possible to find suits where the female voice was considered more 
powerful, although it was heavily circumscribed. According to common law, a woman could 
prosecute in an appeal involving the murder of her husband: it was she who provided the 
narration of the events and identified the perpetrators.55 Indeed, legally and culturally, there 
appears an expectation, an obligation even, that widows would be the ones to prosecute the 
death of a husband rather than another member of his kin. In early Star Chamber records, 
thirty widows brought a bill of complaint as a sole plaintiff in cases relating to the murder of 
their husbands.56 The narrative detail recounted in each petition describes the events leading 
up to the murder and the kill shot or blow. On occasion the widow was with her husband 
                                                          
54 TNA, STAC 2/18/216. These accusations call to mind Juan Luis Vives’s criticism of women as “bablyng, and 
busy, and troublous”: quoted in Stretton, Women Waging Law, 51. 
55 Barbara A. Hanawalt, ‘Of Good and Ill Repute’: Gender and Social Control in Medieval England (Oxford, 
1998), 124. 
56 Although in the case of Alice Swetenham she petitions once on her own and in another petition appears 
alongside her father-in-law: STAC 2/26/30 (own); STAC 2/18/162 (father-in-law). 
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when the attack happened and hence would have direct knowledge of the murder,57 yet in the 
majority of cases she was nowhere near when the fatal wounding occurred. The bill’s 
narrative therefore drew on a range of information she and her legal counsel must have learnt 
subsequently from witnesses, friends and potentially the coroner’s account. There had been 
time to do so because in many instances the widow was not petitioning for an individual to be 
charged, as that had already occurred in a common law court, but for the guilty party to be 
properly punished. The widow’s responsibility to seek full justice for her husband meant 
negotiating multiple jurisdictions. 
By way of contrast, women do not dominate among plaintiffs as victims of personal 
aggression, including rape and abduction.58 The rape, abduction or seduction of women 
appears the main cause in over fifty suits, but also featured as an accusation in others. For 
instance, the action taken by Robert Davies of St Athan (Glamorgan) against William Ievans, 
clerk, seems at first to be a complaint against the exercise of ecclesiastical jurisdiction 
without the king’s royal assent, yet answers given to interrogatories reveal an alleged 
abduction of a local maiden.59 In all these suits, barely a handful were brought to Star 
Chamber by the female victim as plaintiff. Only Margaret Kebell, Katherine Roberts, Joan 
Stanton, Agnes Typlery and Isabel White did so. All were singlewomen or presented 
themselves as such.60 On the one hand, we might have expected to see more examples of 
                                                          
57 Eg. TNA, STAC 2/33/66. 
58 The verbs most regularly used in these cases are ‘to ravish’ and ‘to take away’. The majority of cases in Star 
Chamber relate to abduction, often with the intention of forced marriage, although sexual assault is likely in 
several cases. 
59 TNA, STAC 3/7/40. 
60 TNA, STAC 2/19/71; STAC 2/23/4; STAC 2/25/68 (Kebell); STAC 2/26/105 (Roberts); STAC 2/18/228 
(Stanton); STAC 2/18/15 (Typlary) and STAC 10/1/21 (White). Margaret Kebell’s case has been discussed in 
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female involvement in this type of litigation in Star Chamber. It was limitations in common 
law preventing women bringing cases of abduction that had encouraged women to bypass 
those courts and make their complaints to the king and his council.61 However, as Caroline 
Dunn has pointed out, when a woman was abducted it jeopardised the properties she held for 
her present (or future) husband and children or other heirs. As such, the rights of male 
relatives to “claim the status of injured party” were increasingly upheld by the courts in the 
later Middle Ages.62 Where women most regularly appeared as plaintiffs in bills alleging 
abduction, it was as co-litigants alongside their husbands and mainly where the victim was a 
female relative (often daughter, sometimes sister). It is also noteworthy that the five single 
female plaintiffs mentioned above were not pursuing an appeal of rape (as they might do at 
common law) but for ancillary problems, including the failure of local justices in lower courts 
to deal with their cases. In Typlary’s bill the emphasis was not on the details of the attempted 
rape – which were provided – but on the broken leg she sustained as she was attacked. This 
had left her, a girl in service, “not able to labor for leving” who would be forced to beg. The 
evidence from Star Chamber, therefore, supports the view that male relatives rather than the 
female victim brought cases of abduction to court. It may also indicate that, strategically, 
                                                          
E.W. Ives, ‘ “Agaynst Taking Awaye of Women”: the Inception and Operation of the Abduction Act of 1487’, 
in Wealth and Power in Tudor England: Essays Presented to S.T. Bindoff, ed. E.W. Ives, R.J. Knecht and J.J. 
Scarisbrick (London, 1978). For Katherine Roberts see Deborah Youngs, ‘“She Hym Fresshely Folowed and 
Pursued”: Women and Star Chamber in Early Tudor Wales’, in Women, Agency and the Law, 1300−1700, ed. 
Bronach Kane and Fiona Williamson (London, 2013), 73−85. 
61 Seabourne, Imprisoning Medieval Women, 129−30. 
62 Caroline Dunn, Stolen Women in Medieval England. Rape, Abduction and Adultery, 1100−1500 (Cambridge, 
2013), 97. Some of these cases were actually elopements and hence the suits were brought by irate male family 
members against the actions of the women allegedly abducted: Youngs, ‘A Vice Common in Wales’. 
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counsel and their clients considered the case more likely to succeed in Star Chamber with a 
male plaintiff.  
 
Of all the factors determining the extent of female legal involvement in a suit, none 
was as influential as a woman’s marital status. In theory, women’s loss of legal personhood 
upon marriage placed limits on their economic capacity and wives were prohibited from 
suing in common law courts without the consent and cooperation of their husbands. This 
legal concept of ‘coverture’ might appear to be honoured in practice in Star Chamber given 
the numerous cases that illustrate a husband’s legal guardianship over his wife’s property, 
and where a breach was swiftly identified by defendants. When Margaret Kebell brought a 
bill to Star Chamber against Henry Vernon, knight, the latter countered that Margaret was 
married to Roger Vernon, not named in the bill, and therefore the suit should “abate”.63 
Similarly, in response to a complaint by Alice Tapton, the defendants pointed out that she 
was covert de baron with one William Tapton who was not named in the bill, and hence they 
did not need to provide an answer.64  
Nevertheless, in both cases the defendants’ responses continued to list other reasons 
why the plaintiffs’ bills were wrong, a recognition that they realised a missing husband’s 
name did not in itself amount to a sufficient rebuttal. Recent research on coverture has 
questioned the strict use of the doctrine in a number of jurisdictions and shown that its 
application depended both on the specific court and the litigants themselves; experience often 
                                                          
63 TNA, STAC 2/22/18. See Ives‘ “Agaynst Taking Awaye of Women”. 
64 TNA, STAC 2/26/59 and STAC 2/34/152. 
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varied from spouse to spouse.65 Star Chamber suits can show the variety in approaches. 
Wives rarely appear as litigants, for example, when the offence was a violent attack on their 
person. In many cases this seems to be because a wife’s assault was merely one of a series of 
wrongdoings committed against a household’s property and goods; but this is not 
consistent.66 In cases of real property, however, there is a high proportion of married women 
appearing alongside their husbands, which shows that the couple were considered two 
persons in the court of Star Chamber.67  
Moreover, as the case of Agnes Tapton indicates, married women could not only be 
co-litigants, but sole plaintiffs. Wives can be found acting on behalf of their spouses when the 
latter were absent for some reason: this may have been because the husband was not of sound 
                                                          
65 Stretton, Women Waging Law, 130−2. And see the introductions and essays in Married Women and the Law: 
Coverture in England and the Common Law World, ed. Tim Stretton and Krista J. Kesselring (Ithaca, 2013) and 
in Married Women and the Law in Premodern Northwest Europe, ed. Cordelia Beattie and Matthew Frank 
Stevens (Woodbridge, 2013). 
66 While the vast majority of suits featuring assaults on wives were brought by husbands alone, there are a small 
number of cases where the wife appears as a co-litigant. There is no obvious pattern, although one possibility is 
that the wife was named in those cases where the husband was not an eye-witness: e.g. where a wife was alone 
when attacked and so traumatised by the assault that she had lost her “perfytt wytt and reason”: TNA, STAC 
2/13, fol. 241. 
67 For comparison with other central courts, see Janet Loengard, ‘What is a Nice (Thirteenth-Century) 
Englishwoman Doing in the King’s Courts?’, in The Ties that Bind, ed. Katherine L. French and Douglas L. 
Biggs (London, 2010), 59. By contrast, wives as co-litigants were not visible, and increasingly invisible, in 
fifteenth-century London courts: Stevens, ‘London Women in the Courts’, 75.  
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mind;68 because a wife was pleading for safe-conduct to be granted to her husband;69 or 
because he had been imprisoned.70 In these instances she acted as her husband’s deputy: 
these responsibilities fell within her role as householder and she would be expected to draw 
on the legal knowledge she had gained through that lived experience.71 
The court also allowed wives to sue their husbands, who did so usually on the grounds 
that their position as wife was not being honoured. This was often when absenteeism had 
become more permanent, there was abusive spousal behaviour, and where lands, goods and 
maintenance, which she should legally use and enjoy, were being denied to her. In these 
examples, we see both an acceptance that a woman retained claims over property she brought 
to a marriage, and that the husband had a legal duty to support and protect his wife.72 For 
example, Anne Banester complained that she had been married legally to her husband John 
for over ten years, yet without any obvious cause he had ‘absented’ himself from her 
company. He had refused to provide any allowance and taken all the profits from her 
                                                          
68 Margaret, wife of Thomas Forster, merchant of London, petitioned Star Chamber because she feared that her 
husband who was “lakkyng sufficient naturell reason how to guyde himself” had been duped into giving his 
goods to the Charterhouse in the city: TNA, STAC 2/33/64. 
69 TNA, STAC 2/4, fol. 124. 
70 TNA, STAC 2/24/427. Wives might also petition together, as in the case of the three women who brought an 
action against the abbot of Bury St Edmunds concerning the imprisonment of their husbands in the Fleet:  STAC 
2/1, fos. 23-27. 
71 Musson, Medieval Law in Context, 84. 
72 Amy L. Erickson, Women and Property in Early Modern England (London, 1993), 150; Tim Stretton, ‘The 
Legal Identity of Married Women in England and Europe 1500-1700’, in Europa und seine Regionem: 2000 
jahre rechtsgesgchichte, ed. Andreas Bauer and Karl H.L. Welker (Köln, 2007), 315−317. Cioni, Women and 
Law, 173. 
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inheritance; she and her child were solely reliant on their friends for subsistence.73 Similarly, 
Agnes Wildecote alleged that her husband had taken for himself the yearly profits of both the 
lands she had brought to the marriage, and the jointure bestowed upon them; he had also 
deprived her of meat, drink and clothing so that she was thrown into extreme poverty.74 Other 
examples of the misuse of inheritance and dower/jointure were accompanied with accusations 
of domestic abuse. Hence Kathryn Rocheford accused her husband, John Rocheford of 
Lincoln, of keeping her a prisoner as he signed away her dower, 75 and some husbands of 
‘evil’ dispositions were accused of more violent actions.76 These, and similar suits, clearly 
overlap with the jurisdiction of the church courts, and a few Star Chamber plaintiffs had 
pursued actions in those courts prior to petitioning the king. Yet their strategy in Star 
Chamber was different. Whereas in the ecclesiastical courts, accounts of unreasonable 
behaviour were central to cases of separation, especially those claiming cruelty or coercion, 
in Star Chamber they were intended to build a character-sketch that validated bringing the 
case to its judges. Nor were the women pleading for violent trespass against their husbands, 
but instead were attempting to reinforce a contract or reclaim the loss of their property. As 
such, Star Chamber acted as a mechanism to prevent husbands abusing their control over 
their wives’ properties.77 
                                                          
73 TNA, STAC 2/3, fo.62. 
74 TNA, STAC 2/35/39. 
75 TNA, STAC 2/17/202. 
76 Eg. Thomas Lewis was accused of beating his wife and trying to poison her: TNA, STAC 2/21/62. Very few 
men brought marital issues to Star Chamber: the odd example includes a suit regarding a pre-contract (STAC 
2/25/176), and one where a husband accuses his wife and son of trying to dispossess him (STAC 2/6, fol. 62). 
77 In this way it closely compares to Chancery: Sara M. Butler, Divorce in Medieval England: From One to Two 
Persons in Law (London, 2013), 6. 
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In the cases discussed above, spousal relations had broken down. However, married 
women did not go to the law as sole plaintiffs only when their husbands were incapacitated or 
had left them. Other considerations, beyond strict legal necessities, were weighed up when 
individuals and their counsel decided whom to name as co-litigant. As Stretton has shown, 
wives occasionally appeared as co-litigants in actions which, legally, did not involve their 
property or rights, and the involvement of husbands and wives in each other’s legal affairs 
was frequently assumed.78 Yet, this flexibility also meant that it was legally possible for 
wives to go to Star Chamber without their husbands explicitly named as co-litigants. While 
this can be demonstrated conclusively in only a handful of cases, they again provide 
supporting evidence of the cultural acceptance that title to real property brought to a marriage 
by the woman would remain attached to her. In the late 1520s, for example, Anne Llewellyn 
from St Mildred’s parish, city of London, made a complaint to Star Chamber against Watkin 
Vaughan of Glasbury (Breconshire) who was accused of forcefully preventing Anne from 
inhabiting a tenement called Maesllwch lying within the lordship of Glasbury. She had made 
suit at the Council in the Marches of Wales, but Vaughan had failed to attend and his direct 
actions had occurred at a point where Anne was awaiting the Council’s judgement. She 
appealed, therefore, to the king’s council to sub poena Watkin to appear before Star 
Chamber. In this bill Anne was the sole orator, but in a set of documents relating to the case 
Anne was named alongside her husband John Llewellyn. Anne was evidently married when 
the Star Chamber bill was created (she shares his surname) and she was not described as a 
widow. More strikingly, the supporting documentation indicates that Anne had acted on 
behalf of her and her husband when she laid down her demands: 
                                                          
78 Stretton, Women Waging Law, 136−8. 
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At whiche day [13 November 1527] Anne Llewellyn for hyr self & for hir husbande, 
complaynauntes, and Watkyn Vaughan, defendant, appered at Beaudeley biffore the 
pryncesse counsaill79 wheare these books were seen and red. And forasmoche as the 
said Anne refuseth to appere agayne at any further day affore this counsaill to be 
ordered in this matter, but maketh sute and peticion to have these books to her 
deliyvered to seche hir further remedye hereyn, therefore it is ordred that the said 
Anne have to her delivered all these books annexed together.80 
The items were then detailed and delivered to both Anne and the defendant. The lands 
in question were those inherited by Anne from her father, and it is evident that even when the 
documentation recorded the plaintiffs as John Llewellyn and Anne his wife, it was the latter 
who was recognised as the decision maker. There is no sense that Anne needed her husband’s 
physical presence in the actual proceedings, but for conformity she had indicated that she was 
acting legally for them both. There are comparable examples in other suits focused on a 
wife’s inherited property or actions, and where the main contribution of a husband was his 
name.81 
Nevertheless, if the presence of a co-litigant did not necessarily suggest an active role, 
the absence of one may not adequately reflect the relative roles played by either spouse, 
which could be mutually supportive. The narrative details in Star Chamber proceedings and 
proofs indicate that many more wives were accessories to actions involved in the disputes 
                                                          
79 i.e. the Council in the Marches of Wales. 
80 TNA, STAC 2/23/176, 178. Punctuation added. 
81 E.g. TNA STAC 2/23/249 where the bill concerns the wife’s goods, refers to events prior to her marriage, and 
is written entirely from her perspective; the husband’s name is his only obvious input. 
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than the list of co-litigants suggests.82 They may also be the main protagonist. A case brought 
by Dame Sybil Kirke, Prioress of St Leonard’s, Stratford-at-Bow against John Higham and 
his wife Mary detailed their violation of the injunctions set down by the Lord Chancellor 
following an earlier suit. This included how Mary had often entered the cloister and various 
ladies’ chambers, as well as other parts of the nunnery, without any leave or licence. Being a 
woman meant she was able to advance their cause in locations her husband could not venture. 
She seems to have been far more of a nuisance than her husband to Dame Kirke, yet the 
interrogatories were directed solely to John Higham.83 It appears to be another example 
where legal authorities assumed a wife had not acted independently, but had been directed by 
her husband. By the same token, husbands could support their wives in various ways. This 
can be seen in the case of Margery Finche who described herself as “now the wyf of your 
faithfull subgit Richard Ffinche, doughter & heire of Robert Water & Jone his wyf.” Her 
complaint concerned land she stated she had inherited from her father and which one William 
Wood wrongfully held. Margery was the sole plaintiff and her relation to her parents more 
legally relevant than her marriage to Richard Finche. Despite his absence as co-plaintiff, 
however, Margery made it clear that her husband Richard had and continued to play an active 
role in assisting her with the case. She mentions how he “hath often & diverse tymes in 
curtesse wise questenyd with the said William Wode”, but to no avail. Indeed her husband 
had been threatened by William and told that if he continued to press his wife’s title, he 
                                                          
82 See, for example, the bill of Robert Bate, a Lincolnshire merchant, which recounts his wife’s persistent 
attempts at seeking justice at the Sleaford quarter sessions for her eviction from the family home while he was 
abroad. Yet in this bill he is the sole plaintiff: TNA STAC 1/1/25. 
83 TNA, STAC 2/17/26 (bill); STAC 2/22/349 (answer of John Higham); STAC 2/24/42 (the interrogatories of 
John Higham). 
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would be in jeopardy of his life.84  It is interesting then that while Richard had provided some 
physical and moral support, Margery did not feel the need to include him alongside her as co-
plaintiff. William Wood’s answer has survived and while he disputes Margery’s claims, he 
does not question her right to bring the case herself, and neither did the court.85 It reinforces 
the point that coverture had to be invoked, not assumed. 
 
During the early years of its development, Star Chamber was a court that attracted 
female litigants from across England and Wales, and in similar proportions to those in 
Chancery, a court considered advantageous for women. It still means that less than a fifth of 
cases explicitly included female litigants, and this article has discussed the means by which 
the court both impinged upon and facilitated a woman’s negotiating capacities. On the one 
hand, the court shared a flexibility towards married women’s legal identities that was 
conducive to female litigants: in real property cases there is an acceptance that a wife should 
be legally named as plaintiff in disputes involving her own inheritance or dower. More 
significantly, the court enabled wives to bring suits against their husbands where they had 
been excluded from those properties and the expected securities of married life. Nevertheless, 
the choice of litigant was dependent on a range of factors, linked to broad cultural 
expectations and legal practice. It is evident from Star Chamber documentation that more 
women were involved in disputes – either as victim or accessory – than are named as 
litigants, despite them having sufficient legal standing to be so. Wives (and female plaintiffs 
more generally) were unlikely to be named as litigants when they had been physically hurt 
either in lone attacks or part of a wider attack on a household. It is also the case that far fewer 
                                                          
84 TNA, STAC 2/15/369. 
85 TNA, STAC 2/15/368A. 
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women came as defendants to Star Chamber, and its focus on corrupt officials and emphasis 
on physical force may well have played a part here. Given these structural constraints, the 
extent to which an individual woman’s voice contributed to legal decisions is difficult to 
discern, and we cannot assume that where they were present it was a product of their power. 
Widows may have felt pressurised into pursuing their husbands’ murderers, while daughters 
and wives were perhaps relieved that male relatives were taking action against their attackers. 
Yet the narrative details afforded by Star Chamber records do not suggest that female 
plaintiffs were passive and manipulated, or that it was considered unusual for them to be 
litigating: they were presented as active participants in the framing of the case, their 
opponents’ responses, and in any procedural documentation. For many too, this was not their 
first or only attempt at pursuing justice, and the insights afforded by Star Chamber of their 
previous actions helps deepen our understanding of women’s full and complex involvement 
in the multiple jurisdictions of early Tudor society.  
 
